1According to Lina M. Khan's article, what is a primary structural feature that dominant digital platforms share, which leads to conflicts of interest and entrenches their dominance?
2What is the main argument the article makes regarding the historical application and recent abandonment of structural separations in economic regulation?
3Which of the following are cited as examples of dominant digital platforms that integrate their platform operations with their own commercial interests, leading to conflicts?
4The article suggests that contemporary antitrust law's treatment of vertical integration by dominant networks has shifted away from which type of remedy?
5What is the concept of 'common carriage' as discussed in the article, and how does it relate to network neutrality?
6According to the article, what is a significant risk that third parties face when depending on a dominant digital platform, beyond just discrimination and lock-in?
7The article contrasts structural remedies with behavioral remedies. What is the fundamental difference between them in the context of antitrust and regulation?
8The article identifies several functional goals that motivated previous separations regimes. Which of the following are listed?
9What are some key features of digital markets that can lead to long-term dominance by platforms, according to the article?
10When considering structural separations for digital platforms, what is a significant challenge in defining 'platform' itself?
